Hinweise auf Artikel zur Euro-Politik und zur antipopulistischen Politik

In den letzten Wochen sind zwei ausgezeichnete englische Aufsätze erschienen, die nicht bloß aus wissenschaftlicher Hinsicht hoch interessant sind, sondern auch gut in die Wochen vor der Bundestagswahl passen.

Susan Watkins bespricht in der »London Review of Books« eine Vielzahl an Büchern, die sich um die Euro- und Europa-Politik drehen. Eine ihrer Bilanzen: »The result, as the vanity of the leading continental powers combined with the venality of the smaller ones, was a heterogeneous group of 17 economies, with divergent dynamics, tied to a uniform exchange rate and enjoying a shared credit rating. Rather than helping them converge, the common currency exacerbated the underlying differences between them. Domestic manufacturing in the Mediterranean countries was squeezed by Chinese imports at the lower end – textiles, ceramics, leather goods – while German companies gained an increasing market share at the upper end: cars, chemicals, machinery. At the same time, the easy credit of the globalisation bubble created the illusion that Europe was equalising upwards, as southern consumption was fuelled by northern banks’ cross-border lending.«

Und zum bisherigen politischen Ergebnis der Finanzkrise: »The EU that has emerged from this epic battle is significantly more autocratic, German-dominated and right-wing, while lacking any compensatory charm. […] driven by the financial markets, with the US Treasury and the German Chancellery tugging at the tiller, it has lurched into a new phase of unification, characterised by the same skewed mix of centripetal and centrifugal logic that has shaped its course since Maastricht: asymmetrical integration, combined with inegalitarian enlargement.« (»Vanity and Venality«)

In der »New Left Review« spitzt Marco d’Eramo diese Einschätzung in seiner kleinen Begriffsgeschichte des ›Populismus‹ zur über Europa hinausweisenden Diagnose zu, es handele sich um den »historical moment when the developed world is advancing into an oligarchical despotism, and the opposition between oligarchs and plebs has returned; when anti-popular policies are imposed just as the word ›people‹ is erased from the political lexicon, and anyone opposed to such policies is accused of ›populism‹. […] Yet one reason why more and more movements are coming to be characterized as ›populist‹ is that anti-popular measures are multiplying. You want health care for everyone? You are a populist. You want your pension linked to inflation? But what a bunch of populists! You want your children to go to university, without carrying a life-long burden of debt? I knew you were a populist on the quiet! Thus the oligarchy’s court jesters denounce any popular demand.« (»Populism and the New Oligarchy«)